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a b s t r a c t
This paper studies hedonic coalition formation games where each player’s preferences rely only upon the
members of her coalition. A new stability notion under free exit-free entrymembership rights, referred to
as strong Nash stability, is introducedwhich is stronger than both core and Nash stabilities studied earlier
in the literature. Strong Nash stability has an analogue in non-cooperative games and it is the strongest
stability notion appropriate to the context of hedonic coalition formation games. The weak top-choice
property is introduced and shown to be sufficient for the existence of a strongly Nash stable partition.
It is also shown that descending separable preferences guarantee the existence of a strongly Nash stable
partition. Strong Nash stability under different membership rights is also studied.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Individuals act by forming coalitions under certain economic
and political circumstances such as the provision of public goods
in local communities or forming clubs and organizations. One way
to describe such an environment is to model it as a (pure) hedonic
coalition formation game.
A hedonic coalition formation game consists of a finite non-
empty set of players and a list of players’ preferences where every
player’s preferences depend only on themembers of her coalition.1
An outcome of such a game is a partition of the player set (coalition
structure) -that is, a collection of coalitionswhose union is equal to
the set of players, and which are pairwise disjoint. Marriage prob-
lems and roommate problems (Gale and Shapley (1962), Roth and
Sotomayor (1990)) can be seen as special cases of hedonic coali-
tion formation games, where each agent only considers who will
be his/her mate. In fact, hedonic games are reduced forms of gen-
eral coalition formation games where, for each coalition, how its
total payoff is to be divided among its members is fixed in advance
and made known to all agents.2
Given a hedonic coalition formation game, the main concern
is the existence of partitions that are stable in some sense. The
stability concepts that have been mostly studied so far are core
∗ Tel.: +90 3122902370; fax: +90 3122665140.
E-mail addresses: kmehmet@bilkent.edu.tr, karakayamehmet@gmail.com.
1 The dependence of a player’s utility on the identity of members of her coalition
is referred to as the ‘‘hedonic aspect’’ in Drèze and Greenberg (1980), and the formal
model of (pure) hedonic coalition formation games was introduced by Banerjee
et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).
2 The reader is referred to Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) for a detailed
motivation of (pure) hedonic games.
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core stable if there is no coalition each of whose members strictly
prefers it to the coalition to which she belongs under the given
partition. A partition is said to be Nash stable if there is no player
who benefits from leaving her present coalition to join another
coalition of the partition which might be the ‘‘empty coalition’’ in
this context. Note that a Nash stable partition need not be core
stable, and a core stable partition need not be Nash stable.
One needs to focus attention on two key points when consid-
ering or comparing stability concepts, namely: (i) who can deviate
from the given partition (e.g., a coalition of players as in core sta-
bility, a singleton as in Nash stability), and (ii) what the deviators
are entitled to do (e.g., form a new, self standing coalition as in core
stability, join an already existing coalition—irrespective of how the
incumbent members are effected- as in Nash stability). For hedo-
nic coalition formation games, the second point can be examined
by introducing membership rights. Sertel (1992) introduced four
possible membership rights in an abstract setting. Given a hedonic
game and a partition, themembership rights employed specify the
set of agents whose approval is needed for each particular devia-
tion of a subset of players.
Under free exit-free entry (FX-FE) membership rights, every
agent is entitled to make any movements among the coalitions of
a given partition without taking any permission of members of the
coalitions that she leaves or joins. An example in the context of the
roommate problemwould be that whenever an agent finds a place
in a room, she has the right to move into that room. So, two agents
in different roomsmay benefit by exchanging their rooms without
asking anyone else. Another example is that a citizen of a country
3 See the taxonomy introduced in Sung and Dimitrov (2007) for all stability
concepts which were studied in the literature.
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EU without the permission of either country.
Under free exit-approved entry (FX-AE) membership rights, an
agent can leave her current coalition without the permissions of
her current partners, but she can join another coalition only if all
members of that coalition welcome her, that is her joining does
not hurt anymember of the coalition she joins. A typical example is
provided by clubmembership, where amember of a club can leave
her current club without taking into account whether her leaving
hurts somemembers of that club. However, she needs the approval
of the members of a club that she wants to join. Another example
is that of a researcher, who is a member of a research team and can
leave the team without the permissions of other team members,
while her joining another team is usually subject to the approval
of that team’s present members.
Under approved exit-free entry (AX-FE), every agent is endowed
with rights, under which she can leave her current coalition only
if that coalition’s members approve her leaving, while her joining
requires no one else’s permission. An example would be that of an
army recruiting volunteers. Every healthy citizen in a certain age
interval may enter the army if he volunteers to do so, but is not
allowed to freely exit once he is in.
Under approved exit-approved entry (AX-AE)membership rights
each player needs to get the unanimous permission of the coalition
that she leaves or joins. A typical example is that of a criminal
organization. An agent who is a member of a criminal organization
cannot leave it without permission as she may have information
about some secrets of the organization. Similarly, one cannot join
a criminal organization without permission by a similar token.
Note that under the definition of Nash stability, a player can
deviate by leaving her current coalition to join another coalition
of the partition without any permission of the players of the
coalitions that she leaves or joins, although she might thereby be
hurting some of these. In other words, Nash stability is defined
under FX-FE membership rights.4
The aim of this paper is to study coalitional extension of Nash
stability under FX-FE membership rights, referred to as strong
Nash stability, which has not been studied yet. Note that strong
Nash stability is not defined in Sung and Dimitrov (2007) but they
identified some weaker versions of strong Nash stability.
Two approaches will be employed while defining a strongly
Nash stable partition. The first approach is posed in terms of
an induced non-cooperative game. A hedonic coalition formation
game induces a non-cooperative game in which each player
chooses a ‘‘label’’; players who choose the same label are placed in
a common coalition. Strong Nash (respectively, Nash) stability in
this induced game then corresponds to strong Nash (respectively,
Nash) of the corresponding partition in the coalitional form of
the game. The second approach is posed in terms of movements
and reachability. A partition is said to be strongly Nash stable if
there is no subset of players who reach a new partition via certain
admissible movements such that these players strictly prefer the
new partition to the initial one.
Banerjee et al. (2001) introduced the top-coalition and theweak
top-coalition properties and proved that each property suffices
for a hedonic game to have a core stable partition. Bogomolnaia
and Jackson (2002) introduced two conditions, called ordinal
balancedness and weak consecutiveness. They showed that if a
4 Other stability concepts that consider individual deviations under different
membership rights have already been studied in the literature. That is, individual
stability is defined under FX-AE membership rights (see Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002)), contractual Nash stability is defined under AX-FE membership rights (see
Sung and Dimitrov (2007)), and contractual individual stability is defined under AX-
AE membership rights (see Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) and Ballester (2004)).hedonic game is ordinally balanced or weakly consecutive, then
there exists a core stable partition.5
Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) showed that a hedonic game
which is additively separable and satisfies symmetry has a Nash
stable partition. However, Banerjee et al. (2001) provided an
example of a hedonic game which is additively separable and
satisfies symmetry, but has no core stable partition. Burani and
Zwicker (2003) considered descending separable preferences posed
in the form of several ordinal axioms, and showed that it is
sufficient for the simultaneous existence of Nash and core stable
partition.
The weak top-choice property is introduced by borrowing the
definition of weak top-coalition from Banerjee et al. (2001), and
shown that it guarantees the existence of a strongly Nash stable
partition (Proposition 1). It is also shown that descending separable
preferences suffice for a hedonic game to have a strongly Nash
stable partition (Proposition 2).
How the concept of strong Nash stability changes under dif-
ferent membership rights is also examined. It is shown that un-
der FX-AE membership rights, a partition is FX-AE strictly strongly
Nash stable if and only if it is strictly core stable (Proposition 3),
showing that core stability entails an FX-AE rights structure. Sung
and Dimitrov (2007) defined contractual strict core stability and
showed that for any hedonic game such a partition always exists.
It is proved that under AX-AE membership rights, a partition is
AX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable if and only if it is contractual
strictly core stable (Proposition 4).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic
notions. Section 3 introduces the weak top-choice property and
provides an existence result. Descending separable preferences are
studied in Section 4 and it is shown that there always exists a
strongly Nash stable partition if players have descending separable
preferences. In Section 5, strong Nash stability under different
membership rights is studied.
2. Basic notions
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a nonempty finite set of players. A
nonempty subset H of N is called a coalition. Let i ∈ N be a
player, and Σi = {H ⊆ N | i ∈ H} denote the set of coalitions
each of which contains player i. Each player i has a reflexive,
complete and transitive preference relation ≽i over Σi. So, a
player’s preferences depend only on the members of her coalition.
The strict and indifference preference relations associated with≽i
will be denoted by ≻i and ∼i, respectively. Let ≽= (≽1, . . . ,≽n)
denote a preference profile for the set of players.
Definition 1. A pair G = (N,≽) denote a hedonic coalition
formation game, or simply a hedonic game.
Given a hedonic game, it is required that the set of coalitions
which might form to be a partition of N .
Definition 2. A partition (coalition structure) of a finite set of
players N = {1, . . . , n} is a set π = {H1,H2, . . . ,HK } (K ≤ n is
a positive integer) such that
(i) for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, Hk ≠ ∅,
(ii)
K
k=1 Hk = N , and
(iii) for any k, l ∈ {1, . . . , K}with k ≠ l, Hk ∩ Hl = ∅.
5 For other studies concerning the existence of core stable partitions, the reader is
referred toAlcalde andRomero-Medina (2006), Alcalde andRevilla (2004), Dimitrov
et al. (2006) and Pápai (2004), among others.
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Π(N) and any i ∈ N , let π(i) ∈ π denote the unique coalition
which contains the player i. Since we are working with hedonic
games, for any player i ∈ N , the preference relation≽i overΣi can
be extended over the set of all partitions Π(N) in a usual way as
follows: For anyπ, π´ ∈ Π(N), [π ≽i π´ ] if and only if [π(i)≽i π´(i)].
Definition 3. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition
π ∈ Π(N) is individually rational for player i if π(i)≽i{i} and is
individually rational if it is individually rational for every player
i ∈ N .
A partition is individually rational if each player prefers the
coalition that she is a member of to being single, i.e., each agent
i prefers π(i) to {i}.
Definition 4. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition π ∈
Π(N) is core stable if there does not exist a coalition T ⊆ N such
that for all i ∈ T , T ≻i π(i). If such a coalition T exists, then it is said
that T blocks π .6
Definition 5. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game and π ∈ Π(N) a
partition. We say that a player i ∈ N Nash blocks π if there exists
a coalition H ∈ (π ∪ {∅}) such that H ∪ {i}≻i π(i). A partition is
Nash stable if there does not exist a player who Nash blocks it.
Two approaches will be employed while defining the strongly
Nash stable partition. In the first one, the non-cooperative game
induced by a hedonic game is used.
Every hedonic game induces a non-cooperative game as defined
below.7
Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game with |N| = n players.
Consider the following induced non-cooperative game Γ G =
(N, (Si)i∈N , (Ri)i∈N)which is defined as follows:
• The set of players in Γ G is the player set N of G.
• LetL = {L1, . . . , Lm}be a finite set of labels such thatm = n+1.
Take L to be the set of strategies available to each player, so
Si = L for each i ∈ N . Let S = ∏i∈N Si denote the strategy
space. A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S induces a partition
πs ofN as follows: twoplayers i, j ofN are in the samepiece ofπs
if and only if si = sj (i and j choose the same strategy according
to s).
• Preferences for Γ G is defined as follows: a player i prefers the
strategy profile s to the strategy profile s´, sRis´, if and only if
πs(i)≽i πs´(i), i.e., player i prefers the coalition of those who
choose the same strategy as she does according to s, to the
coalition of those who choose the same strategy as she does
according to s´.
Now, the main stability concept of this paper will be defined by
using the induced non-cooperative game approach.
Definition 6. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition π ∈
Π(N) is strongly Nash stable if it is induced by a strategy profile
which is a strong Nash equilibrium of the induced non-cooperative
game Γ G.
Thus, the Nash equilibria of Γ G correspond to the Nash stable
partitions of G, and the strong Nash equilibria of Γ G correspond
to the strongly Nash stable partitions of G. Hence, strong Nash
stability has an analogue in non-cooperative games, and it is the
6 A partition π ∈ Π(N) is strictly core stable if there does not exist a coalition
T ⊆ N such that for all i ∈ T , T ≽i π(i), and for some i ∈ T , T ≻i π(i). If such a
coalition T exists, then it is said that Tweakly blocksπ .
7 I am grateful to the Associate Editor for suggesting this approach.strongest natural stability notion appropriate to the context of
hedonic games.
If the strategy profile s which induces the partition πs is not a
strong Nash equilibrium of Γ G, then there is a subset of players
H ⊆ N which deviates from s (according to s) and this deviation is
beneficial to all agents inH . In such a case, it is said thatH strongly
Nash blocks the partition πs.
The second approach is posed in terms of movements and
reachability which is derived from the first one.
Let πs be a partition which is induced by the strategy profile
s, and H ⊆ N be a deviating subset of players. The deviation of
these players from s can be explained as movements among the
coalitions of the partition πs, where the allowable movements of
these players are as follows8:
(i) All players in H ∉ πs choose a label which is not chosen
by any player under s.9 Let s´ denote the strategy profile that
is obtained by this deviation. Now, H ∈ πs´. This deviation
means in terms of movements that all players in H leave their
current coalitions and form the coalition H ∈ πs´ (which is
the movement used in the definition of blocking in the core
stability).
(ii) All players in H10 choose the label which is chosen by
members of a coalition T ∈ πs. Lets denote the strategy profile
that is obtained by this deviation. Now, (H ∪ T ) ∈ πs. This
deviation means all players in H leave their current coalitions
and join another coalition T of πs, so for each i ∈ H , πs(i) =
T ∪ H .
(iii) Players inH ∉ πs partition among themselves as {H1, . . . ,Ht},
and for any k ∈ {1, . . . , t}, agents inHk choose the label which
is chosen under s by an agent j ∈ Hk+1, where it is taken
t + 1 = 1. Lets denote the strategy profile that is obtained
by this deviation. Now, for any i ∈ Hk, πs(i) = (πs(j)\H)∪Hk.
This deviation means individual players in H (or subsets of
H) exchange their current coalitions in the partition πs. For
instance, let H = {i, j} ∉ πs and player i leaves πs(i) and joins
πs(j) \ {j}, and player j leaves πs(j) and joins πs(i) \ {i}. So,
πs(i) = (πs(j) \ {j}) ∪ {i} and πs(j) = (πs(i) \ {i}) ∪ {j}. Note
that more complicatedmovements are possible when the size
of H increases.11
Given a partition π and a subset of players H ⊆ N , by any
movements of H among the coalitions of the partition π , players
of H obtain a new partition π´ , and it is said that π´ is reachable
from the partition π via H .
Definition 7. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game and π ∈ Π(N)
be a partition. Another partition π´ ∈ (Π(N) \ {π}) is said to be
reachable from π by movements of a subset of players H ⊆ N ,
denoted by π
H−→ π´ , if, for all i, j ∈ (N \ H) with i ≠ j, π(i) =
π(j)⇔ π´(i) = π´(j).
8 Movements of H are coordinated and simultaneous.
9 Such a label always exists, sincem = n+ 1.
10 It is possible in here that H ∈ πs .
11 Movements of H among the coalitions of the partition πs can also be explained
as follows: Each player inH leaves the coalition that she belongs under partition πs .
Let π−Hs = {T \ H | T ∈ πs and T \ H ≠ ∅} denote the set of coalitions after each
player in H leaves her current coalition. Now, individual players or subsets of H can
join any coalition (or an empty set) of (π−Hs ∪ {∅}). This approach is similar to the
one given by Conley and Konishi (2002). In their approach, a set of agents is only
allowed to form coalitions among themselves, i.e., individual players or subsets of
H are only permitted to join the empty set. However, in our approach individual
players or subsets of H are allowed to join not only the empty set but also any
coalition of π−Hs .
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that agents who are not deviators are passive, and a non-deviator
remains with all former mates who are not deviators. Notice that
a subset of playersH ⊇ H can do all movements that H can. Note
that for any π ∈ Π(N) and π´ ∈ (Π(N) \ {π}), π N−→ π´ , i.e., given
any partition π all other partitions can be reached by movements
of the grand coalition N .
Now, the strong Nash stability of a partition can also be defined
in terms of movements and reachability.
Definition 8. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition π ∈
Π(N) is strongly Nash stable if there does not exist a pair (π´,H)
(where π´ ∈ (Π(N) \ {π}) and ∅ ≠ H ⊆ N) such that
(i) π
H−→ π´ (π´ is reachable from π by movements of H), and
(ii) for all i ∈ H , π´(i)≻i π(i).
If such a pair (π´,H) exists, then it is said that H strongly Nash
blocks π (by inducing π´ ).
Note that the two definitions of strongly Nash stable partitions
are equivalent (Definitions 6 and 8).
It is clear that a strongly Nash stable partition is both core and
Nash stable. However, a hedonic game which has a partition that
is both core and Nash stable may not have a strongly Nash stable
partition.
Example 1. Let G = (N,≽), where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the
preferences of players are as follows:
{1, 4}≻1{1, 2}≻1{1, 3, 4}≻1{1, 3}≻1{1}≻1 . . . , 12
{2, 4}≻2{1, 2}≻2{2, 3, 4}≻2{2}≻2 . . . ,
{1, 3}≻3{3, 4}≻3{1, 2, 3}≻3{3}≻3 . . . ,
{3, 4}≻4{1, 2, 4}≻4{2, 4}≻4{4}≻4 . . . .
The partitionsπ = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} andπ = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}} are
the only partitions which are both core stable and Nash stable, and
there is no partition π ∈ (Π(N) \ {π,π}) which is either core
stable or Nash stable. However, neither π nor π is strongly Nash
stable.
Let s denote the strategy profile in Γ G which induces the
partitionπ . So, players 1 and 2 choose the same label unders, say L´,
and players 3 and 4 choose the same label unders, say L¯. Thuss =
(L´, L´, L¯, L¯). The strategy profiles is not a strong Nash equilibrium
of Γ G, since players 2 and 3 deviate froms as follows:13Player 2
chooses label L¯ and player 3 chooses label L´. Lets = (L´, L¯, L´, L¯)
denote the strategy profile that is obtained by the deviation of
players 2 and 3. Now, the strategy profiles induces the partitionπ = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}}.14 This deviation is beneficial to both players
2 and 3, sinceπ(2)≻2π(2) andπ(3)≻3π(3). Therefore,π is not
strongly Nash stable.
Now consider the partition π = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}}. π is not
strongly Nash stable, since players 1 and 4 strongly Nash block the
partitionπ by exchanging their current coalitions, i.e.,π {1,4}−−→ π ,
andπ(1)≻1π(1) andπ(4)≻4π(4).
Hence the partitions π and π are not strongly Nash stable,
whereas they are both core and Nash stable. Therefore there is no
strongly Nash stable partition for this game.
12 Note that only individually rational coalitions are listed in a player’s preference
list, since remaining coalitions for the player can be listed in any way.
13 Note that players 2 and3dislike eachother, that is {2}≻2{2, 3} and {3}≻3{2, 3}.
14 This deviation means in terms of movements that players 2 and 3 exchange the
coalitions that they are in underπ , and the partitionπ is reached by thismovement.Iehlé (2007) introduced pivotal balancedness and showed that it
is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a core stable
partition. As strong Nash stability implies core stability, and the
hedonic game in Example 1 has a core stable partition but lacks any
strongly Nash stable partitions, it follows that pivotal balancedness
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for strong Nash stability.
3. The weak top-choice property
Banerjee et al. (2001) introduced two top-coalition properties
and showed that each property is sufficient for a hedonic game to
have a core stable partition.
Given a nonempty set of players N ⊆ N , a nonempty subset
H ⊆ N is a top-coalition of N if for any i ∈ H and any T ⊆ N
with i ∈ T , we have H ≽i T . A game G = (N,≽) satisfies the top-
coalition property if for any nonempty set of playersN ⊆ N , there
exists a top-coalition ofN .
Given a nonempty set of players N ⊆ N , a nonempty subset
H ⊆ N is a weak top-coalition of N if H has an ordered partition
{H1, . . . ,H l} such that
(i) for any i ∈ H1 and any T ⊆ N with i ∈ T , we have H ≽i T , and
(ii) for any k > 1, any i ∈ Hk and any T ⊆ N with i ∈ T , we have
T ≻i H ⇒ T ∩ (m<k Hm) ≠ ∅.
A game G = (N,≽) satisfies the weak top-coalition property if
for any nonempty set of players N ⊆ N , there exists a weak top-
coalition ofN .
For any nonempty set of players H ⊆ N , let W (H) denote
the weak top-coalitions of H . Thus, W (N) denote the weak top-
coalitions of the grand coalition N .
Definition 9. A hedonic game G = (N,≽) satisfies the weak top-
choice property ifW (N) partitions N .
Proposition 1. If a hedonic game satisfies the weak top-choice prop-
erty, then it has a strongly Nash stable partition.
Proof. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic gamewhich satisfies the weak
top-choice property. Let W (N) = {H1, . . . ,HK } with correspond-
ingpartitions {H11 , . . . ,H l(1)1 }, . . . , {H1K , . . . ,H l(K)K }. Clearly,W (N) is
a partition forN since the game satisfies theweak top-choice prop-
erty. LetW (N) = π ⋆. It will be shown that π ⋆ is strongly Nash sta-
ble. Suppose that π ⋆ is not strongly Nash stable. Then, there exists
a nonempty subset of players H ⊆ N which strongly Nash blocks
the partition π ⋆.
Note that H ∩ (Kj=1 H1j ) = ∅, since for any j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, for
any i ∈ H1j and any T ∈ Σi, Hj≽i T . Now it will be shown that
H ∩ (Kj=1 H2j ) = ∅. For any j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, any agent i ∈ H2j needs
the cooperation of at least one agent inH1j in order to form a better
coalition than Hj. That is, for any i ∈ H2j and any T ∈ Σi, T ≻i Hj
implies T ∩ H1j ≠ ∅. However, it is known that H ∩ H1j = ∅ for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, so H ∩ (Kj=1 H2j ) = ∅.
Continuing with the similar arguments it is shown that H ∩
(
K
j=1 H
k
j ) = ∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . , l¯}, where l¯ = max{l(1), . . . , l(K)}. However, this implies that there does not exist a
nonempty subset of playersH ⊆ N which strongly Nash blocks the
partition π ⋆, a contradiction. Hence π ⋆ is strongly Nash stable.
We have constructed examples showing that the weak top-
choice property and the weak top-coalition property are inde-
pendent of each other.15 If a game satisfies the weak top-choice
15 These examples are provided as a supplementary material to the Associate
Editor and two referees, but are not included in the paper. A reader who wants to
see these examples may contact the Author.
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have more than one strongly Nash stable partition, we provided
such an example.
A stronger version of the weak top-choice property can be
defined as follows (by using the definition of top-coalition): A
hedonic game G = (N,≽) satisfies the top-choice property if the
top-coalitions of the grand coalition N form a partition of N . Now,
if a hedonic game satisfies the top-choice property then it has a
strongly Nash stable partition, where the proof is left to the reader.
Moreover, if every player’s best coalition is unique then there exists
a unique strongly Nash stable partition which consists of the top-
coalitions of N . We have constructed examples showing that the
top-choice property and the top-coalition property (respectively,
the weak top-coalition property) are independent of each other. It
is clear that if a hedonic game satisfies the top-choice property then
it also satisfies the weak top-choice property. However, a hedonic
game satisfying the weak top-choice property may fail to satisfy
the top-choice property.
An application of the weak top-choice property is Benassy
(1982)’s uniform reallocation rule.16 Banerjee et al. (2001) showed
that a hedonic game which is induced by the uniform reallocation
rule satisfies the weak top-coalition property, by proving that any
subsetN ⊆ N is aweak top-coalition of itself. Hence, theweak top-
choice property is satisfied, and the partition {N} is strongly Nash
stable. Note that a hedonic game which is induced by the uniform
reallocation rule may violate the top-choice property.17
4. Descending separable preferences
In a well established paper, Burani and Zwicker (2003) study
hedonic gameswhenplayers have descending separable preferences,
and show that such a hedonic game always has a partition, which
is called the top segment partition, that is both core and Nash
stable. Burani and Zwicker (2003) will be followed to define
descending separable preferences and the top segment partition.18
Let p : N → N be apermutation of the set of players and assume
that p yields a strict reference ranking of players
p1 > p2 > · · · > pn. (1)
The following conditions are defined for an individual player’s
preferences.
Condition 1 (Common Ranking of Individuals, CRI). For any three
distinct players pi, pj and pk, if pj > pk then {pi, pj}≽pi{pi, pk}.
Condition 2 (Descending Desire, DD). For any pair pi, pj of distinct
players with pi > pj and for any coalition C containing neither
player pi nor pj, if {pj} ∪ C ≽pj{pj} then {pi} ∪ C ≽pi{pi} and if{pj} ∪ C ≻pj{pj} then {pi} ∪ C ≻pi{pi}.
Condition 3 (Separable Preferences, SP). A profile of players’ pref-
erences is separable if, for every i, j ∈ N and every coalition C
such that C ∈ Σi and j ∉ C , {i, j}≽i{i} ⇔ C ∪ {j}≽i C and
{i, j}≻i{i} ⇔ C ∪ {j}≻i C .
Condition SP implies the property of iterated separable prefer-
ences.
16 See Banerjee et al. (2001) for details of the hedonic game derived from the
uniform reallocation rule.
17 See example 3 (page 152) of Banerjee et al. (2001) for such an example.
18 The reader is referred to Burani and Zwicker (2003) for more details of
descending separable preferences and the construction of the top segment
partition.Definition 10 (Iterated Separable Preferences). For any player pi
and for any two disjoint coalitions C and D with C ∋ pi, if
{pi, d}≽pi{pi} for every d ∈ D then C ∪D≽pi C , and if {pi, d}≻pi{pi}
for every d ∈ D then C ∪ D≻pi C .
Condition 4 (Group Separable Preferences, GSP). For any player pi
and for any two disjoint coalitions C and D with C ∋ pi, if {pi} ∪
D≽pi{pi} then C ∪ D≽pi C and if {pi} ∪ D≻pi{pi} then C ∪ D≻pi C .
Condition 5 (Responsive Preferences, RESP). For any triple of play-
ers pi, pj, pk and for any coalition C such that pj, pk ∉ C and
pi ∈ C , {pi, pj}≽pi{pi, pk} if and only if {pj} ∪ C ≽pi{pk} ∪ C and{pi, pj}≻pi{pi, pk} if and only if {pj} ∪ C ≻pi{pk} ∪ C .
Condition 6 (Replaceable Preferences, REP). For any pair pi, pj of
distinct players with pi > pj and for any coalition C containing nei-
ther player pi nor pj, if {pi, pj} ∪ C ≽pj{pj} then {pi, pj} ∪ C ≽pi{pi}
and if {pi, pj} ∪ C ≻pj{pj} then {pi, pj} ∪ C ≻pi{pi}.
Condition REP implies descending mutual preferences.
Definition 11 (Descending Mutual Preferences). For any pair pi, pj
of distinct players with pi > pj, if {pi, pj}≽pj{pj} then {pi, pj}≽pi{pi} and if {pi, pj}≻pj{pj} then {pi, pj}≻pi{pi}.
Definition 12. A profile of agents’ preferences is descending sep-
arable if there exists a reference ordering (1) under which Condi-
tions 1 (CRI), 2 (DD), 3 (SP), 4 (GSP), 5 (RESP), and 6 (REP) all hold.
LetG = (N,≽) be a hedonic gamewhere players have descend-
ing separable preferences. A partition π ⋆ = {T ⋆, {pl+1}, . . . , {pn}}
is called a top-segment partition which is obtained in terms of the
reference ordering (1) as follows: First, the top-segment coalition T ⋆
is formed. Player p1, the first agent in the ordering, belongs to the
top-segment coalition. If the next agent, player p2, strictly prefers
being alone to joining p1, then T ⋆ is completed and T ⋆ = {p1}.
If, however, {p1, p2}≽p2{p2}, then player p2 is added to T ⋆. Con-
tinue to add players from left to right until a player, denoted as
pl+1, is reached who strictly prefers staying alone to joining the
growing coalition (or until everyone joins, if such an agent pl+1
is never reached). The top-segment coalition is denoted by T ⋆ =
{p1, . . . , pl}. Second, let players from pl+1 to pn each form a one
member coalition.
Following results are taken from Burani and Zwicker (2003)
which will be helpful while proving that a hedonic game with
descending separable preferences always has a strongly Nash
stable partition.
Lemma 1 (Burani and Zwicker (2003), Lemma 1, page 37). Every
individually rational coalition contains at most l members.
It is shown in Burani and Zwicker (2003) that there exists a
coalition ∅ ≠ T ⋆⋆ = {p1, . . . , pf } contained in T ⋆ such that
{pi, pl}≽pi{pi} holds for each agent pi ∈ T ⋆⋆, where such an agent
with the highest index is denoted by pf .
Lemma 2 (Burani and Zwicker (2003), Lemma 3, page 38). For each
of the players in T ⋆⋆ = {p1, . . . , pf } ⊂ T ⋆, coalition T ⋆ is top-ranked
among individually rational coalitions (or tied for top). Therefore, no
deviating coalition can contain any of the players in T ⋆⋆.
We will also need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For each player pk ∈ {pl+1, . . . , pn}, {pk}≻pk{pj, pk}
holds for any pj ∈ {pf+1, . . . , pl} = T ⋆ \ T ⋆⋆.
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sider agent pf+1. Since pf+1 ∉ T ⋆⋆, {pf+1}≻pf+1{pf+1, pl}. Then,
condition CRI and transitivity of preferences imply, {pf+1}≻pf+1{pf+1, pl+1}. This fact, together with descending mutual prefer-
ences, yields that {pl+1}≻pl+1{pf+1, pl+1}. Now, by condition CRI,{pl+1}≻pl+1{pj, pl+1} holds for any pj ∈ {pf+1, . . . , pl}. It is also
needed to show independently that {pl+1}≻pl+1{pl, pl+1} holds, in
case T ⋆⋆ = {p1, . . . , pl−1}. Suppose not. Condition CRI then implies
that {pj, pl+1}≽pl+1{pl+1} for all pj ∈ T ⋆. Now, iterated separable
preferences imply that (T ⋆∪{pl+1})≽pl+1{pl+1}which is in contra-
diction with pl+1 ∉ T ⋆. So, {pl+1}≻pl+1{pl, pl+1} also holds. Hence,{pl+1}≻pl+1{pj, pl+1} for any pj ∈ {pf+1, . . . , pl}.
Second, by condition DD, it holds for any pk < pl+1 that
{pk}≻pk{pj, pk} for every pj ∈ {pf+1, . . . , pl}, completing the
proof. 
Our main result with descending separable preferences is now
stated and proved.
Proposition 2. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. If players have
descending separable preferences, then there always exists a strongly
Nash stable partition.
Proof. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game where players
have descending separable preferences. Let π ⋆ be a top-segment
partition. It is known by Burani and Zwicker (2003) that π ⋆ is both
core and Nash stable. It will be shown that π ⋆ is strongly Nash
stable. Suppose that π ⋆ is not strongly Nash stable. Then, there
exists a pair (π,H) where π ∈ (Π(N) \ {π ⋆}) and ∅ ≠ H ⊆ N
such thatπ ⋆
H−→ π and for all i ∈ H ,π(i)≻i π ⋆(i). Note that |H| > 1
since π ⋆ is Nash stable.
Since π ⋆ is both core and Nash stable, and it is supposed that
H strongly Nash blocks the partition π ⋆, another remaining four
possible cases will be checked.
Case 1. H ⊆ {pl+1, . . . , pn} and H strongly Nash blocks the top-
segment partition π ⋆ by joining T ⋆.19
Since H strongly Nash blocks the partition π ⋆ by joining T ⋆,
(T ⋆ ∪ H)≻pj{pj} for all pj ∈ H . For any pi ∈ T ⋆ and any pj ∈ H ,
pi > pj. So, by condition REP, it holds for each pi ∈ T ⋆ that
(T ⋆∪H)≻pi{pi}. Hence, (T ⋆∪H)would be an individually rational
coalition which contradicts with Lemma 1, since |(T ⋆∪H)| > l. So,
there is no subset H of {pl+1, . . . , pn} which strongly Nash blocks
the top-segment partition π ⋆ by joining T ⋆.
Case 2.H $ {pl+1, . . . , pn}, pi ∈ [N \(T ⋆∪H)], andH strongly Nash
blocks the top-segment partition π ⋆ by joining {pi}.20
Since H strongly Nash blocks the partition π ⋆ by joining {pi},
(H ∪{pi})≻pj{pj} for all pj ∈ H . Note that since π ⋆ is Nash stable, it
is true for every pj ∈ H that {pj}≽pj{pj, pk} for all pk ∈ [(H \ {pj})∪{pi}]. Then, iterated separable preferences imply that {pj}≽pj(H ∪{pi}) for every pj ∈ H . This is in contradiction with the fact that H
strongly Nash blocks the partition π ⋆ by joining {pi}. Hence, there
does not exist a proper subset H of {pl+1, . . . , pn} which strongly
Nash blocks the top-segment partition π ⋆ by joining {pi}, where
pi ∈ [N \ (T ⋆ ∪ H)].
Case 3. H ⊆ T ⋆, pi ∈ {pl+1, . . . , pn}, and H strongly Nash blocks the
top-segment partition π ⋆ by joining {pi}.21
Since H ⊆ T ⋆ strongly Nash blocks the partition π ⋆ by joining
{pi}, (H ∪ {pi})≻pj T ⋆ for all pj ∈ H . This fact, together with
19 So, π = {T ⋆ ∪ H} = {{N}} if H = {pl+1, . . . , pn}, and π = {T ⋆ ∪ H, {{pj} | pj ∈
N \ (T ⋆ ∪ H)}} if H $ {pl+1, . . . , pn}.
20 So, π = {T ⋆,H ∪ {pi}, {{pj} | pj ∈ [N \ (T ⋆ ∪H ∪ {pi})]}} if H ≠ N \ (T ⋆ ∪ {pi}),
and π = {T ⋆,H ∪ {pi}} if H = N \ (T ⋆ ∪ {pi}).
21 Now, π = {T ⋆ \ H,H ∪ {pi}, {{pj} | pj ∈ N \ (T ⋆ ∪ {pi})}} if H $ T ⋆ , and
π = {H ∪ {pi}, {{pj} | pj ∈ N \ (T ⋆ ∪ {pi})}} if H = T ⋆ .Lemma 2, implies thatH∩T ⋆⋆ = ∅. Let ph ∈ H be a player such that
ph > pj for all pj ∈ (H \ {ph}). Note that ph ≠ pl, because |H| > 1.
Since ph ∉ T ⋆⋆, agent ph has preferences such that {ph}≻ph{ph, pl}.
Condition CRI yields that {ph, pl}≽ph{ph, pi} because pl > pi,
and transitivity of preferences implies, {ph}≻ph{ph, pi}. Then,
descendingmutuality implies, {pj}≻pj{pj, pi}holds for each pj ∈ H .
This result combinedwith condition SP implies thatH ≻pj(H∪{pi})
for every pj ∈ H . Now, transitivity of preferences yields for each
pj ∈ H that H ≻pj T ⋆. However, this is in contradiction with π ⋆
being core stable, i.e., H would block the partition π ⋆. Hence, there
is no subset H of T ⋆ which strongly Nash blocks the top-segment
partition π ⋆ by joining {pi}, where pi ∈ {pl+1, . . . , pn}.
Case 4. H = H1 ∪ H2, where H1 ⊆ T ⋆ and H2 $ {pl+1, . . . , pn},
pi ∈ N \ (T ⋆ ∪ H2), and H strongly Nash blocks the top-segment
partition π ⋆ by joining {pi}.22
So, (H ∪ {pi})≻pj T ⋆ for all pj ∈ H1, and (H ∪ {pi})≻pk{pk}
for all pk ∈ H2. Since π ⋆ is Nash stable, it holds for each pk ∈
H2 that, {pk}≽pk{pk, ph} for any ph ∈ [(H2 \ {pk}) ∪ {pi}]. Now,
Lemma 2 implies that H1 ∩ T ⋆⋆ = ∅, i.e., H1 ⊆ {pf+1, . . . , pl}.
This fact, together with Lemma 3, implies that, for each pk ∈ H2,
{pk}≻pk{pk, pj} for any pj ∈ H1. Hence, for each pk ∈ H2 it holds
that {pk}≽pk{pk, px} for all px ∈ [(H \ {pk}) ∪ {pi}]. Then, iterated
separable preferences imply that {pk}≽pk(H ∪ {pi}) for all pk ∈ H2,
which is the desired contradiction. Hence, there does not exist
H = H1 ∪ H2, where H1 ⊆ T ⋆ and H2 $ {pl+1, . . . , pn}, which
strongly Nash blocks the top-segment partition π ⋆ by joining {pi},
where pi ∈ N \ (T ⋆ ∪ H2).
Since the four cases cover all possibilities, it is concluded that
there does not exist a subset of players ∅ ≠ H ⊆ N which strongly
Nash blocks the top-segment partition π ⋆. Hence π ⋆ is strongly
Nash stable. 
Based on Proposition 2, one can argue that Burani and Zwicker
(2003) were studying the wrong solution concept; they really
should have been applying their methods to strong Nash stability.
We have constructed examples showing that preferences are
descending separable and the weak top-choice properties are
independent of each other.
Burani and Zwicker (2003) also studied hedonic games on
additively separable and symmetric domain of preferences where
players’ preferences are purely cardinal.
A hedonic game G = (N,≽) is additively separable if for any
i ∈ N , there exists a function vi : N → R such that for any
H, T ∈ Σi, H ≽i T ⇔ ∑j∈H vi(j) ≥ ∑j∈T vi(j), where vi(j) = 0
for i = j. An additively separable hedonic game satisfies symmetry
if for any i, j ∈ N , vi(j) = vj(i).
Definition 13. A profile of additively separable and symmetric
preferences is purely cardinal if there exists an assignment of
individual weights w(i) to the players for which the following
vector v represents the profile: for all i, j ∈ N ,
v(i, j) =

w(i)+ w(j) if i ≠ j
0 if i = j.
For any player i, her individual weight w(i) represents the
fixed individual contribution that she brings to any member of
the coalition that she belongs. Purely cardinal preferences are
descending separable, where the reference ranking (1) of agents is
the permutation that ranks them in non-increasing order of their
weights. Hence, a hedonic game with purely cardinal preferences
22 So, π = {T ⋆ \ H1,H ∪ {pi}, {{pj} | pj ∈ [N \ (T ⋆ ∪ H2 ∪ {pi})]}} if H1 $ T ⋆ , and
π = {H ∪ {pi}, {{pj} | pj ∈ [N \ (T ⋆ ∪ H2 ∪ {pi})]}} if H1 = T ⋆ . Note that H1 ≠ ∅ by
case 2 and H2 ≠ ∅ by case 3.
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provided an example showing that purely cardinal preferences is
not a necessary condition for a game to have a strongly Nash stable
partition.
We have constructed examples showing that preferences being
purely cardinal and theweak top-choice property are independent
of each other. Note that players’ preferences need not be purely
cardinal for a separable23 and anonymous game.
Ahedonic gameG = (N,≽) satisfiesanonymity if for any i ∈ N ,
for any H, T ∈ Σi with |H| = |T |, H∼iT .
The proof of the following lemma is left to the reader.
Lemma 4. If a hedonic game is anonymous, additively separable and
symmetric, then players’ preferences are purely cardinal (hence has a
strongly Nash stable partition).
Also note that if a hedonic game is anonymous, additively
separable and symmetric, then it satisfies the top-choice property,
where the proof is left to the reader. However, we have given an
example showing that a hedonic game which satisfies the top-
choice property may not be additively separable and symmetric.
The strong Nash stability for hedonic games is not the unique
stability notion which has not been studied earlier. In fact, two
other stability notions for hedonic games can be defined.24
Definition 14. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game andπ ∈ Π(N) a
partition.We say that a subset of players T ⊆ N coalitionally Nash
blocks π if there exists a coalition H ∈ (π ∪{∅}) such that for each
player i ∈ T , (H∪T )≻i π(i). A partition is coalitionally Nash stable
if there does not exist a subset of players which coalitionally Nash
blocks it.
Definition 15. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition
π ∈ Π(N) is core-exchange stable if it is core stable and there does
not exist a subset of players T ⊆ N such that individual players in T
or subsets of T (strongly Nash) blockπ by exchanging their current
coalitions under π .
It is clear that these two concepts are independent of each other,
and each of these concepts is weaker than strong Nash stability.
Moreover, a partition is both coalitionally Nash stable and core-
exchange stable if and only if it is strongly Nash stable.
Open question. We have constructed an example showing that
neither the weak top-choice property nor the preferences being
descending separable is necessary for a hedonic game to have a
strongly Nash stable partition. Hence, it is an open question to find
a conditionwhich is both necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a strongly Nash stable partition.
5. Strong Nash stability under different membership rights
Different societies may have different membership rights, and
a designer employs a certain rights structure to achieve some
aims. This section studies how the concept of strong Nash stability
changes under different membership rights. We will see that
strong Nash stability under different membership rights fits with
the earlier concepts.
FX-FE strong Nash stability is what has been called strong Nash
stability in previous sections. Now, its strict version is defined.
Definition 16. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition
π ∈ Π(N) is free exit-free entry strictly strongly Nash stable (FX-
FE strictly strongly Nash stable) if there does not exist a pair (π´,H)
(where π´ ∈ (Π(N) \ {π}) and ∅ ≠ H ⊆ N) such that
23 A hedonic game is separable if players’ preferences satisfy Condition 3 (SP).
24 These definitions and the following open question are motivated by questions
posed by two anonymous referees.(i) π
H−→ π´ (π´ is reachable from π by movements of H),
(ii) for all i ∈ H , π´(i)≽i π(i), and for some i ∈ H , π´(i)≻i π(i).
Definition 17. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition
π ∈ Π(N) is free exit-approved entry strongly Nash stable
(FX-AE strongly Nash stable) if there does not exist a pair (π´,H)
such that
(i) π
H−→ π´ ,
(ii) for all i ∈ H , π´(i)≻i π(i), and
(iii) for all i ∈ H , for all k ∈ (π´(i) \ {i}), π´(k)≽k π(k).
Definition 18. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition
π ∈ Π(N) is approved exit-approved entry strongly Nash stable
(AX-AE strongly Nash stable) if there does not exist a pair (π´,H)
such that
(i) π
H−→ π´ ,
(ii) for all i ∈ H , π´(i)≻i π(i), and
(iii) for all k ∈ (N \ H), π´(k)≽k π(k).
Definition 19. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition
π ∈ Π(N) is approved exit-free entry strongly Nash stable (AX-
FE strongly Nash stable) if there does not exist a pair (π´,H) such
that
(i) π
H−→ π´ ,
(ii) for all i ∈ H , π´(i)≻i π(i), and
(iii) for all i ∈ H , for all j ∈ (π(i) \ {i}), π´(j)≽j π(j).
Strict versions of concepts given in Definitions 17–19 are
defined by replacing item (ii) with [for all i ∈ H , π´(i)≽i π(i), and
for some i ∈ H , π´(i)≻i π(i)].
Lemma 5. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. If a partition π ∈
Π(N) is FX-AE strongly Nash stable, then it is core stable.
Proof. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game and π ∈ Π(N) be an
FX-AE strongly Nash stable partition. Suppose that π is not core
stable. Then, there is a coalition T ⊆ N such that for all i ∈ T ,
T ≻i π(i). Let π´ = {T , {{H \T } | H ∈ π and H \T ≠ ∅}} denote the
partition that is obtained from coalition T ’s blocking of π . Now, it
is shown that the pair (π´, T ) satisfies the three conditions of FX-AE
strong Nash stability. First, it is clear that π´ is reachable from π by
T , i.e., π
T−→ π´ . Second, since it is supposed that T blocks π , i.e., for
any i ∈ T , T = π´(i)≻i π(i). Third, for any i ∈ T , π´(i) \ {i} = T \ {i}.
So, for all i ∈ T , for all k ∈ (π´(i) \ {i}), we have π´(k)≻k π(k).
Hence, the pair (π´, T ) satisfies the three conditions of FX-AE strong
Nash stability, in contradiction with π being FX-AE strongly Nash
stable, i.e., coalition T would block the partition π under FX-AE
membership rights. Hence, π is core stable. 
Note that this lemma implies that if a partition is FX-AE strictly
strongly Nash stable, then it is strictly core stable. Now, it is shown
that the converse of this lemma is true under the assumption that
players have strict preferences.
Lemma 6. Let G = (N,≻) be a hedonic game where players have
strict preferences. If a partition π ∈ Π(N) is core stable, then it is
FX-AE strongly Nash stable.
Proof. Let G = (N,≻) be a hedonic game where players have
strict preferences. Letπ ∈ Π(N)be a core stable partition. Suppose
that π is not FX-AE strongly Nash stable. Then, there exists a pair
(π´,H) such that players in H strongly Nash block the partition π
by inducing π´ under FX-AE membership rights.
Since π is core stable, H cannot block π . So, H strongly Nash
blocks the partition π by either players in H (or subsets of H)
exchange their current coalitions that they belong under π or
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coalition of the partition π . In either case, there exists a coalition
T ∈ π´ such that T ∩ H ≠ ∅. Since the membership rights is FX-
AE and players have strict preferences, we have π´(j)≻j π(j) for
all players j ∈ (T \ H). This result, together with the fact that
H strongly Nash blocks the partition π , implies that π´(i)≻i π(i)
for all i ∈ T . However, this is in contradiction with π being core
stable, i.e., coalition T would block the partition π . Hence, π is FX-
AE strongly Nash stable. 
This lemma is not true without the assumption of strict prefer-
ences.
Example 2. Let G = (N,≽), where N = {1, 2} and players’ pref-
erences are as follows: {1, 2}∼1{1}, and {1, 2}≻2{2}.
The partition π = {{1}, {2}} is core stable. However π is not
FX-AE strongly Nash stable, since player 2 strongly Nash blocks
the partition π by joining {1} under FX-AE membership rights,
i.e., π
{2}−→ π´ = {{1, 2}}, and π´(2)≻2 π(2) and π´(1)∼1π(1).
Lemma 6 implies, if a partition is strictly core stable, then it is
FX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable. The following proposition is an
implication of Lemmas 5 and 6.
Proposition 3. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition
π ∈ Π(N) is FX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable if and only if it is
strictly core stable.
Note that if players have strict preferences then a partition is
FX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable if and only if it is FX-AE strongly
Nash stable, and a partition is strictly core stable if and only if it is
core stable. Proposition 3 shows that core stability entails an FX-AE
rights structure.
Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition π ∈ Π(N)
is contractual core stable (defined in Sung and Dimitrov (2007)) if
there does not exist a coalition T ⊆ N such that
(i) for all i ∈ T , T ≻i π(i) and
(ii) for all j ∈ (N \ T ), π(j) \ T ≽j π(j).
Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition π ∈ Π(N)
is contractual strictly core stable (defined in Sung and Dimitrov
(2007)) if there does not exist a coalition T ⊆ N such that
(i) for all i ∈ T , T ≽i π(i),
(ii) for some i ∈ T , T ≻i π(i), and
(iii) for all j ∈ (N \ T ), π(j) \ T ≽j π(j).
Lemma 7. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. If a partition π ∈
Π(N) is AX-AE strongly Nash stable, then it is contractual core stable.
Proof. LetG = (N,≽) be a hedonic game andπ ∈ Π(N) be an AX-
AE strongly Nash stable partition. Suppose thatπ is not contractual
core stable. Then, there is a coalition T ⊆ N such that for all i ∈ T ,
T ≻i π(i) and for all j ∈ (N \ T ), π(j) \ T ≽j π(j).
Let π´ = {T , {{π(j) \ T } | j ∈ (N \ T ) and π(j) \ T ≠ ∅}} denote
the partition that is obtained from coalition T ’s blocking ofπ . Now,
it is shown that the pair (π´, T ) satisfies the three conditions of
AX-AE strong Nash stability. The first two conditions are trivially
satisfied, i.e., π
T−→ π´ , and for all i ∈ T , T = π´(i)≻i π(i).
Let H = {j ∈ N | j ∉ T and j ∈ π(i) for some i ∈ T } and
H¯ = {j¯ ∈ N | j¯ ∉ π(i) for any i ∈ T }. Note that H, H¯ and T
are pairwise disjoint, and N = H ∪ H¯ ∪ T . Since it is supposed
that T blocks π and this blocking does not hurt any player, for
any j ∈ H we have π´(j)≽j π(j). Note that H¯ = {j¯ ∈ N |
π´(j¯) = π(j¯)}, so for any j¯ ∈ H¯ we have π´(j¯)∼j¯π(j¯). Hence, for any
k ∈ (N \ T ) we have π´(k)≽k π(k), i.e., the third condition of AX-
AE strong Nash stability is also satisfied by the pair (π´, T ). Hence,
the pair (π´, T ) satisfies the three conditions of AX-AE strong Nash
stability, this contradicts with π being AX-AE strongly Nash stable.
That is, T would strongly Nash block the partition π under AX-AE
membership rights. Hence, π is contractual core stable. By this lemma, it can be said that if a partition is AX-AE strictly
strongly Nash stable, then it is contractual strictly core stable.
Now, it is shown that the converse of Lemma 7 is true under the
assumption that players have strict preferences.
Lemma 8. Let G = (N,≻) be a hedonic game where players have
strict preferences. If a partition π ∈ Π(N) is contractual core stable,
then it is AX-AE strongly Nash stable.
Proof. LetG = (N,≻)be ahedonic gamewhere players have strict
preferences. Let π ∈ Π(N) be a contractual core stable partition.
Suppose that π is not AX-AE strongly Nash stable. Then, there
exists a pair (π´,H) such that H strongly Nash blocks the partition
π by inducing π´ under AX-AE membership rights.
Let T = {i ∈ N | π´(i) ≠ π(i)} denote the set of agents whose
coalitions changed from π to π´ . Note that T ≠ ∅. Now, for any
i ∈ T we have π´(i)≻i π(i), since players have strict preferences
and it is supposed that π is not AX-AE strongly Nash stable.
However, each player in T leaves her current coalition under π ,
and forms the coalitions T1, . . . , TK which are pairwise disjoint and
their union is equal to T such that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, Tk ∈ π´ .
Now, for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, we have, for all i ∈ Tk, Tk≻i π(i)
and for all j ∈ (N \ Tk), π(j) \ Tk≽j π(j). This is in contradiction
with π being contractual core stable, i.e., for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K},
a coalition Tk would block the partition π without hurting other
players. Hence, π is AX-AE strongly Nash stable. 
Lemma 8may fail to be true if the assumption that players have
strict preferences is relaxed.25 By Lemma 8, it can be said that, if a
partition is contractual strictly core stable, then it is AX-AE strictly
strongly Nash stable. The next proposition follows from Lemmas 7
and 8.
Proposition 4. Let G = (N,≽) be a hedonic game. A partition
π ∈ Π(N) is AX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable if and only if it is
contractual strictly core stable.
Sung and Dimitrov (2007) showed that for any hedonic game a
contractual strictly core stable partition always exists. This result
together with Proposition 4 implies that an AX-AE strictly strongly
Nash stable partition always exists for any hedonic game.
Note that, if a partition is AX-FE strongly Nash stable, then it
is AX-AE strongly Nash stable. This fact and Lemma 7 imply, if
a partition π ∈ Π(N) is AX-FE strongly Nash stable then it is
contractual core stable. However, the converse is not true.
Example 3. Let G = (N,≽), where N = {1, 2} and players’
preferences are as follows: {1}≻1{1, 2}, and {1, 2}≻2{2}.
The partitionπ = {{1}, {2}} is contractual core stable. However
π is not AX-FE strongly Nash stable, since player 2 strongly Nash
blocks the partition π by joining {1} under AX-FE membership
rights, i.e., π
{2}−→ π´ = {{1, 2}}, and π´(2)≻2 π(2) and π(2)\ {2} =
∅, i.e., there is no player that player 2 needs to get a permission to
leave from the coalition π(2).26
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